1 00:00:03,172 --> 00:00:05,517 Sundance 518, taxi across Runway 24 Left. 2 00:00:05,586 --> 00:00:07,517 Contact Ground,. 65... 3 00:00:07,586 --> 00:00:10,344 February the 1st, 1991. 4 00:00:10,413 --> 00:00:13,413 Los Angeles International Airport, LAX. 5 00:00:13,482 --> 00:00:15,827 246 heading 270, 6 00:00:15,896 --> 00:00:17,344 contact Los Angeles Departure. 7 00:00:17,413 --> 00:00:21,172 Thank you. USAir 1493, you're cleared to land, 24 Left. 8 00:00:21,241 --> 00:00:24,344 Cleared to land, 24 Left, 1493. 9 00:00:25,344 --> 00:00:28,068 Travelling at 240 kph, 10 00:00:28,137 --> 00:00:32,758 USAir Flight 1493 descends towards Runway 24 Left. 11 00:00:34,862 --> 00:00:36,758 What the hell?! 12 00:00:40,241 --> 00:00:42,827 I pointed to the aircraft and yelled: "USAir's crashing." 13 00:00:43,724 --> 00:00:46,517 The aircraft was fully engulfed in flames. 14 00:00:49,103 --> 00:00:53,206 But the full scope of this tragedy is far greater than anyone can imagine. 15 00:00:57,724 --> 00:01:00,103 Mayday, mayday. 16 00:01:18,241 --> 00:01:19,793 We need more pressure! 17 00:01:20,965 --> 00:01:23,689 At one of the busiest airports in the world, 18 00:01:23,758 --> 00:01:27,137 a Boeing 737 has just exploded in flames upon landing. 19 00:01:29,448 --> 00:01:32,275 I think the thought process in the tower was... It was 1991, 20 00:01:32,344 --> 00:01:35,275 it was one of the first nights of the first Gulf War, 21 00:01:35,344 --> 00:01:38,862 and I think the thing that was foremost in our mind 22 00:01:38,931 --> 00:01:41,517 was maybe it was a bomb that went off in the aircraft. 23 00:01:42,965 --> 00:01:45,862 As firefighters bring the blaze under control, 24 00:01:45,931 --> 00:01:48,206 rescuers begin searching for survivors. 25 00:01:49,068 --> 00:01:51,827 About five minutes after the incident occurred, 26 00:01:51,896 --> 00:01:54,172 we got a call from an emergency vehicle. 27 00:01:55,206 --> 00:01:58,241 Amid the wreckage, they have made an alarming discovery, 28 00:01:58,310 --> 00:02:00,793 one that forces everyone involved 29 00:02:00,862 --> 00:02:03,965 to re-examine every detail of the last 15 minutes. 30 00:02:19,379 --> 00:02:23,413 USAir Flight 1493 cruises towards Los Angeles International Airport. 31 00:02:27,275 --> 00:02:30,448 LAX is a central hub for international travellers. 32 00:02:34,379 --> 00:02:39,724 Just confirm the visual approach for USAir 1493 is 24 Left. 33 00:02:40,758 --> 00:02:43,379 That's correct, USAir 1493. 34 00:02:43,448 --> 00:02:47,689 For the approach, Captain Colin Shaw is managing radio communications. 35 00:02:49,758 --> 00:02:52,517 First Officer David Kelly is at the controls. 36 00:02:57,896 --> 00:03:00,379 With 89 passengers on board, 37 00:03:00,448 --> 00:03:02,344 the flight isn't quite full. 38 00:03:06,172 --> 00:03:09,000 Well, I'd been on a business trip to Columbus, Ohio. 39 00:03:10,103 --> 00:03:13,379 I went from the business meetings to Columbus Airport, 40 00:03:13,448 --> 00:03:17,448 and got on a USAir flight that was nonstop to Los Angeles. 41 00:03:19,241 --> 00:03:23,034 I planned a lot of good things and good times for that weekend. 42 00:03:24,517 --> 00:03:26,931 USAir 1493, 43 00:03:27,000 --> 00:03:30,758 expedite your descent through 4,000 as much as practical, if you would. 44 00:03:30,827 --> 00:03:33,689 There will be traffic pass above you on the south side. 45 00:03:33,758 --> 00:03:37,068 As the Boeing 737 nears Los Angeles, 46 00:03:37,137 --> 00:03:40,275 the approach controller tells the pilots to make a quick descent. 47 00:03:41,758 --> 00:03:44,827 They will need to stay clear of a flight passing above them. 48 00:03:45,758 --> 00:03:49,241 Okay, I'll expedite through four. USAir 1493. 49 00:03:53,413 --> 00:03:56,241 Landing at LAX can be a challenge for pilots. 50 00:03:57,034 --> 00:04:00,620 The airspace around the airport is often thick with traffic. 51 00:04:02,034 --> 00:04:05,551 On average, a plane arrives or departs every 50 seconds. 52 00:04:08,482 --> 00:04:12,000 Each of its four runways handles both takeoffs and landings. 53 00:04:13,482 --> 00:04:16,551 Taxiways intersect the runways at dozens of locations. 54 00:04:18,724 --> 00:04:20,758 The airport can be a maze of stops and starts 55 00:04:20,827 --> 00:04:23,275 for pilots following instructions issued by controllers. 56 00:04:26,551 --> 00:04:28,724 You got the left side in sight? 57 00:04:30,000 --> 00:04:31,344 Yeah. 58 00:04:32,827 --> 00:04:34,310 We're out of four. 59 00:04:55,517 --> 00:04:58,379 USAir 1493, thanks for your help. 60 00:04:58,448 --> 00:05:01,758 Contact Los Angeles Tower, 133.9. Good night. 61 00:05:02,482 --> 00:05:03,793 Good night. 62 00:05:05,482 --> 00:05:07,103 Gear down. 63 00:05:07,172 --> 00:05:10,000 - Alright. You gave three bells? - Yes, I did. 64 00:05:17,206 --> 00:05:19,310 Perched 12 storeys above the ground, 65 00:05:19,379 --> 00:05:23,103 tower controllers have a hawk's eye view of traffic 66 00:05:23,172 --> 00:05:25,137 coming and going from the airport. 67 00:05:26,034 --> 00:05:28,965 It was a busy night, there was a lot of airplanes. 68 00:05:29,034 --> 00:05:32,586 We had numerous arrivals and departures, uh, during that time of the night. 69 00:05:32,655 --> 00:05:34,448 So it was a typical day. 70 00:05:34,965 --> 00:05:37,827 Elliot Brann is the clearance delivery controller. 71 00:05:39,103 --> 00:05:42,137 The primary duties of the clearance delivery controller 72 00:05:42,206 --> 00:05:45,931 is issuing the routes of flight and the flight plans to the pilots 73 00:05:46,000 --> 00:05:47,965 as they come out of the computer. 74 00:05:48,758 --> 00:05:52,137 A flight strip is printed out, so you get a piece of paper with the call sign, 75 00:05:52,206 --> 00:05:53,689 type of aircraft, route of flight. 76 00:05:53,758 --> 00:05:57,000 I issue the clearance to the pilot and then... 77 00:05:57,068 --> 00:06:00,000 I pass the strips, the flight information, to the next controller. 78 00:06:01,310 --> 00:06:04,344 Brann shares flight information with four other controllers. 79 00:06:05,620 --> 00:06:09,931 Two ground controllers, who handle planes moving between the gates and the runways; 80 00:06:11,206 --> 00:06:15,551 and two local controllers, who are responsible for planes taking off and landing. 81 00:06:18,413 --> 00:06:20,413 Tonight, local controller Robin Wascher 82 00:06:20,482 --> 00:06:23,586 is overseeing the two north runways at LAX: 83 00:06:23,655 --> 00:06:25,482 24 Left and 24 Right. 84 00:06:27,931 --> 00:06:32,344 She uses the flight strips to keep track of flights departing and arriving. 85 00:06:32,413 --> 00:06:36,000 USAir 23, taxi into position and hold, Runway 24 Left. 86 00:06:36,620 --> 00:06:39,413 Position and hold, 24 Left, USAir 23. 87 00:06:39,482 --> 00:06:41,896 4974 Zero Echo. 88 00:06:41,965 --> 00:06:45,724 - 246, you still holding short of 47? - 246. Affirmative. 89 00:06:45,793 --> 00:06:47,344 Alright, you're next. 90 00:06:48,206 --> 00:06:51,586 SkyWest 569, taxi up and hold short of Runway 24 Left. 91 00:06:51,655 --> 00:06:53,344 Roger. Hold short. 92 00:07:00,689 --> 00:07:03,482 2785. 93 00:07:03,551 --> 00:07:05,551 Good night, ma'am. 94 00:07:07,758 --> 00:07:11,689 USAir Flight 1493 is about 13 kilometres from LAX. 95 00:07:14,448 --> 00:07:17,206 The pilots configure their plane for landing. 96 00:07:17,275 --> 00:07:22,000 Speed brakes. ♪ Still workin' for a livin' ♪ 97 00:07:22,068 --> 00:07:23,758 Alright. 98 00:07:24,689 --> 00:07:26,172 Flaps a-goin': 1. 99 00:07:29,586 --> 00:07:31,206 Flaps. 100 00:07:31,275 --> 00:07:34,896 Now the pilots radio the LAX tower for landing instructions. 101 00:07:35,827 --> 00:07:38,862 USAir 1493... inside Roman. 102 00:07:40,517 --> 00:07:43,689 Wings 5006, Ground, uh, Tower. 103 00:07:46,482 --> 00:07:49,310 Robin Wascher is busy with other planes. 104 00:07:49,379 --> 00:07:52,620 She doesn't respond to their radio call. 105 00:07:52,689 --> 00:07:57,000 SkyWest 569, taxi into position and hold, Runway 24 Left. 106 00:07:57,068 --> 00:07:58,758 Traffic will cross downfield. 107 00:07:59,448 --> 00:08:02,931 Okay, 24 Left, position and hold. SkyWest 569. 108 00:08:04,448 --> 00:08:06,655 Wings West 5006, Tower. 109 00:08:06,724 --> 00:08:09,793 Nav 2166... approach, 164.5. 110 00:08:13,586 --> 00:08:14,689 Thirty. 111 00:08:14,758 --> 00:08:17,448 Green light. Detent. 112 00:08:17,517 --> 00:08:19,551 Gear. Flaps. 113 00:08:19,620 --> 00:08:21,862 Landing clearance remains. 114 00:08:24,655 --> 00:08:26,931 Just six kilometres from the airport, 115 00:08:27,000 --> 00:08:30,137 the USAir jet still doesn't have the okay to land. 116 00:08:41,344 --> 00:08:44,413 Sundance 518, taxi across Runway 24 Left. 117 00:08:44,482 --> 00:08:47,793 Contact Ground,. 65, when you're off the runway. Good night. 118 00:08:52,241 --> 00:08:55,482 Captain Shaw contacts the tower for the second time 119 00:08:55,551 --> 00:08:57,344 in less than a minute. 120 00:08:57,413 --> 00:08:59,517 He needs Wascher's permission to land. 121 00:08:59,586 --> 00:09:02,551 USAir 1493 for the left side, 122 00:09:02,620 --> 00:09:04,172 24 Left. 123 00:09:04,931 --> 00:09:09,517 246 heading 270, contact Los Angeles Departure. Good night. 124 00:09:09,586 --> 00:09:12,068 But she's still focused on other planes. 125 00:09:16,758 --> 00:09:18,275 Out of 1,000 feet. 126 00:09:19,482 --> 00:09:22,758 Flight 1493 is now one minute from the runway. 127 00:09:22,827 --> 00:09:25,413 It's what pilots call "short final." 128 00:09:31,103 --> 00:09:33,379 Sometimes due to other priorities that take place, 129 00:09:33,448 --> 00:09:36,620 an aircraft might not get a landing clearance until short final. 130 00:09:42,344 --> 00:09:44,931 Thank you, USAir 1493, you're cleared to land, 131 00:09:45,000 --> 00:09:46,931 24 Left. - Cleared to land, 132 00:09:47,000 --> 00:09:49,517 24 Left, 1493. 133 00:10:02,862 --> 00:10:04,310 Looks real good. 134 00:10:05,172 --> 00:10:06,413 Ah... 135 00:10:08,586 --> 00:10:10,482 You're coming out of 500. 136 00:10:27,482 --> 00:10:28,793 What the hell?! 137 00:10:38,448 --> 00:10:40,827 The USAir 737 has barely touched down. 138 00:10:41,724 --> 00:10:43,551 It erupts in flames and crashes 139 00:10:43,620 --> 00:10:45,931 through Los Angeles International Airport. 140 00:10:47,620 --> 00:10:52,034 I saw USAir touch down and as he got about mid... 141 00:10:52,103 --> 00:10:54,896 about third-way down the runway at taxiway 45, 142 00:10:54,965 --> 00:10:57,482 the aircraft was fully engulfed in flames. 143 00:10:59,689 --> 00:11:03,827 The supervisor ran past me to pick up the crash phone 144 00:11:03,896 --> 00:11:06,586 and alert the emergency vehicles to respond. 145 00:11:07,896 --> 00:11:10,379 Aboard the flight, sheer terror. 146 00:11:12,931 --> 00:11:16,655 There was a tremendous, uh, crunching sensation. 147 00:11:18,034 --> 00:11:21,172 And there was this extraordinary shower of sparks 148 00:11:21,241 --> 00:11:23,034 that shot by my window. 149 00:11:34,172 --> 00:11:35,413 Good God. 150 00:11:37,689 --> 00:11:40,724 Rosa Reynoso is a plainclothes officer with the Airport Police. 151 00:11:41,275 --> 00:11:43,793 We see the aircraft engulfed in fire. 152 00:11:44,862 --> 00:11:48,344 My partner and I were probably about 500 yards from it. 153 00:11:48,413 --> 00:11:50,379 Alert 33, Runway 24L. 154 00:11:50,448 --> 00:11:52,620 Affirmative. Alert 33. 155 00:11:55,517 --> 00:11:58,137 The initial moments were very scary, 156 00:11:58,206 --> 00:12:00,034 um, very chaotic. 157 00:12:00,103 --> 00:12:02,379 I remember just thinking to myself: Oh, God, 158 00:12:02,448 --> 00:12:04,448 please get some more people out here. 159 00:12:04,517 --> 00:12:08,103 Get me fire, get me officers, get me somebody, 160 00:12:08,172 --> 00:12:10,310 'cause this is not good. 161 00:12:14,034 --> 00:12:17,000 In the tower, there's no time to dwell on what's happened. 162 00:12:17,068 --> 00:12:19,482 Other aircraft are still coming in to land. 163 00:12:20,482 --> 00:12:22,724 Controllers must direct them to safety. 164 00:12:22,793 --> 00:12:24,724 Wings West 5212, 165 00:12:24,793 --> 00:12:26,275 wind 240 at 8. 166 00:12:26,344 --> 00:12:28,000 You are cleared to land, 167 00:12:28,068 --> 00:12:29,793 Runway 24 Right. 168 00:12:29,862 --> 00:12:31,724 Use caution. 169 00:12:31,793 --> 00:12:34,655 We just had an aircraft go off the runway in flames. 170 00:12:43,379 --> 00:12:46,896 The cabin of Flight 1493 is filling with toxic smoke. 171 00:12:50,172 --> 00:12:53,206 Some passengers rush to a door at the rear of the plane. 172 00:12:55,965 --> 00:12:59,689 I probably got seven or eight rows down the aisle, and, uh, 173 00:12:59,758 --> 00:13:04,172 and then I encountered a cluster of passengers standing in the... 174 00:13:04,241 --> 00:13:06,137 in the aisle, not moving. 175 00:13:06,206 --> 00:13:09,137 I thought to myself: 176 00:13:09,206 --> 00:13:11,689 There must be an opening in the front of the plane 177 00:13:11,758 --> 00:13:14,758 that allowed for this tremendous quantity of smoke 178 00:13:14,827 --> 00:13:16,551 to roll into the plane so quickly. 179 00:13:18,241 --> 00:13:22,827 And so I stumbled forward to the... the cockpit area, 180 00:13:22,896 --> 00:13:26,620 and there was tremendous fire on both sides of the plane. 181 00:13:27,862 --> 00:13:30,517 I said to myself: My gosh, 182 00:13:30,586 --> 00:13:33,827 there's no way you're gonna get out of this airplane, David; you're trapped. 183 00:13:35,068 --> 00:13:37,482 Outside, some have escaped the plane. 184 00:13:40,862 --> 00:13:44,448 Rosa Reynoso is the first emergency responder to arrive at the scene. 185 00:13:46,413 --> 00:13:50,068 The fire was intense, uh, it was very, very hot. 186 00:13:50,137 --> 00:13:51,655 I mean, almost singeing us. 187 00:13:53,482 --> 00:13:55,413 She needs to act fast 188 00:13:55,482 --> 00:13:57,965 to help passengers away from the burning wreckage. 189 00:13:59,103 --> 00:14:04,206 The passengers were trying to escape the plane, uh, from the emergency-exit doors. 190 00:14:04,275 --> 00:14:06,827 However, the fire had engulfed the doors, 191 00:14:06,896 --> 00:14:09,655 so some of the people that were fine 192 00:14:09,724 --> 00:14:12,206 jumped out of the plane and into the fire. 193 00:14:13,379 --> 00:14:16,413 More emergency personnel arrive within minutes. 194 00:14:16,482 --> 00:14:19,000 Most passengers are jumping out of that door. 195 00:14:19,068 --> 00:14:20,758 Some people were on fire. 196 00:14:21,896 --> 00:14:24,586 Some of them were scratched, cut up. 197 00:14:25,310 --> 00:14:27,482 Some of them had broken legs. 198 00:14:28,793 --> 00:14:30,413 It was pretty traumatic. 199 00:14:32,689 --> 00:14:36,862 And I think you just start operating on knowing you have to do the right thing 200 00:14:36,931 --> 00:14:38,689 and try and save these people. 201 00:14:43,310 --> 00:14:45,034 David Koch is still inside. 202 00:14:47,103 --> 00:14:49,137 I suddenly saw a crack of light. 203 00:14:49,758 --> 00:14:52,827 And my god... it was a miracle. 204 00:14:52,896 --> 00:14:54,482 The crack opened up, 205 00:14:54,551 --> 00:14:56,655 and I suddenly realized 206 00:14:56,724 --> 00:15:00,103 that I had opened the galley door. 207 00:15:01,379 --> 00:15:03,551 But now he faces another hurdle. 208 00:15:05,172 --> 00:15:08,068 He can't even see the ground through the fire and smoke. 209 00:15:09,000 --> 00:15:11,551 And I said to myself: 210 00:15:11,620 --> 00:15:13,482 What the hell. And jumped out. 211 00:15:16,827 --> 00:15:19,034 I landed on the ground, 212 00:15:19,103 --> 00:15:21,896 and then started crawling on my hands and knees 213 00:15:21,965 --> 00:15:23,689 away from the airplane. 214 00:15:26,379 --> 00:15:29,206 I had a great sense of guilt. 215 00:15:30,000 --> 00:15:34,103 Why did I not go back into the airplane and say "follow me"? 216 00:15:36,586 --> 00:15:38,758 And I think if I'd gone back into the cabin, 217 00:15:38,827 --> 00:15:43,137 I might've passed out and fallen on the floor and died. 218 00:15:45,517 --> 00:15:48,034 And that's how I've come to terms with the fact that, uh, 219 00:15:48,103 --> 00:15:51,517 I... I got out, but didn't help anybody else out. 220 00:15:59,275 --> 00:16:01,482 As the search for survivors continues, 221 00:16:01,551 --> 00:16:03,482 firefighters make a stunning find. 222 00:16:07,413 --> 00:16:10,586 This is Rescue 1. We've got a propeller down here in the wreckage. 223 00:16:14,862 --> 00:16:18,103 The discovery of a propeller has horrifying implications. 224 00:16:19,241 --> 00:16:21,206 There's two planes down here. 225 00:16:26,344 --> 00:16:28,793 As soon as we found out that information, we started actively... 226 00:16:28,862 --> 00:16:32,862 looking to see, uh, what aircraft, if any, were missing. 227 00:16:35,103 --> 00:16:38,103 So we started looking at the flight strips that were already departed, 228 00:16:38,172 --> 00:16:41,206 and then we looked at the ones that were still pending. 229 00:16:41,275 --> 00:16:44,137 And then we called the Departure Control, radar controller, 230 00:16:44,206 --> 00:16:47,551 to find out which ones they've talked to in the last five, six minutes. 231 00:16:49,413 --> 00:16:51,241 What about SkyWest 5569? 232 00:16:52,000 --> 00:16:53,689 No, we haven't heard from them. 233 00:16:54,620 --> 00:16:58,379 SkyWest 5569, taxi into position, hold, Runway 24 Left. 234 00:16:58,448 --> 00:17:00,413 Okay, 24 Left, position and hold. 235 00:17:00,482 --> 00:17:02,206 SkyWest 569. 236 00:17:08,689 --> 00:17:12,551 Staff can account for all of the aircraft except for SkyWest 5569, 237 00:17:12,620 --> 00:17:16,620 a Fairchild Metroliner bound for Palmdale, California. 238 00:17:25,655 --> 00:17:30,551 Emergency personnel find parts of the smaller plane strewn across Runway 24 Left. 239 00:17:32,517 --> 00:17:34,862 There were 20 people on board the flight. 240 00:17:36,000 --> 00:17:37,551 None have survived. 241 00:17:39,793 --> 00:17:43,896 What's left of their plane is crushed between USAir 1493... 242 00:17:44,827 --> 00:17:47,068 ...and an abandoned building near the runway. 243 00:17:47,137 --> 00:17:50,620 My first thought was: Oh, my God... 244 00:17:50,689 --> 00:17:53,862 there's someone else under there, and we didn't even realize it. 245 00:17:56,379 --> 00:17:59,758 There's even more loss of life on board the larger plane. 246 00:17:59,827 --> 00:18:02,896 Twenty are dead. Two others are mortally wounded. 247 00:18:04,103 --> 00:18:06,275 First Officer Kelly has survived, 248 00:18:06,344 --> 00:18:07,965 but Captain Shaw has not. 249 00:18:08,620 --> 00:18:11,724 The disaster thrusts LAX into the media spotlight. 250 00:18:14,310 --> 00:18:16,827 America's runways, according to the nation's pilots: 251 00:18:16,896 --> 00:18:19,137 The most dangerous part of the flight. 252 00:18:19,931 --> 00:18:22,517 In the months and years leading up to the crash, 253 00:18:22,586 --> 00:18:25,103 increasing traffic was becoming a safety concern 254 00:18:25,172 --> 00:18:26,896 at Los Angeles International Airport. 255 00:18:30,448 --> 00:18:33,655 The most close calls: Los Angeles International Airport. 256 00:18:33,724 --> 00:18:37,000 Thirty-three near-collisions over the last four years. 257 00:18:37,586 --> 00:18:39,517 That's one every month and a half. 258 00:18:39,586 --> 00:18:42,862 The accident confirms safety issues need to be addressed. 259 00:18:47,379 --> 00:18:51,965 The National Transportation Safety Board sends its Go Team to LAX to investigate. 260 00:18:53,931 --> 00:18:56,000 It was kind of a horrific scene. 261 00:18:57,172 --> 00:18:59,413 The front end of the airplane was, uh, 262 00:18:59,482 --> 00:19:03,551 was impaled on the captain's side against the building. 263 00:19:04,068 --> 00:19:06,517 And with close inspection, 264 00:19:06,586 --> 00:19:09,758 we could see parts of another aircraft underneath. 265 00:19:13,137 --> 00:19:15,862 Investigators can see that the two planes collided 266 00:19:15,931 --> 00:19:18,413 at an intersection on Runway 24 Left. 267 00:19:21,275 --> 00:19:24,103 The scenario of the accident, uh... 268 00:19:24,172 --> 00:19:27,379 resulted in two planes being on the runway at the same time. 269 00:19:28,344 --> 00:19:29,965 The runway was occupied. 270 00:19:30,965 --> 00:19:32,793 And that's something that should never happen 271 00:19:32,862 --> 00:19:34,931 when a landing clearance is granted. 272 00:19:37,344 --> 00:19:43,000 Reducing collisions on U.S. runways is a priority for investigators from the NTSB. 273 00:19:43,068 --> 00:19:47,620 We had runway incursions on the Most Wanted List from 1990, 274 00:19:47,689 --> 00:19:49,862 here at the Safety Board, 275 00:19:49,931 --> 00:19:52,827 and it's a major concern for, uh... 276 00:19:52,896 --> 00:19:54,413 the whole industry. 277 00:19:55,482 --> 00:19:59,931 A runway incursion is simply when an inappropriate object 278 00:20:00,000 --> 00:20:05,379 is out on a runway that's gonna be used for a takeoff or landing. 279 00:20:07,965 --> 00:20:11,862 Some of the world's worst airline disasters have taken place on runways. 280 00:20:15,413 --> 00:20:17,275 In March 1977, 281 00:20:17,344 --> 00:20:19,620 on the island of Tenerife, 282 00:20:19,689 --> 00:20:24,931 583 people died when two Boeing 747s collided on the runway. 283 00:20:28,241 --> 00:20:30,137 In January 1990, 284 00:20:30,206 --> 00:20:35,758 a Beechcraft King Air 100 was struck by a Boeing 727 attempting to land in Atlanta. 285 00:20:39,827 --> 00:20:41,517 Later that year in Detroit, 286 00:20:41,586 --> 00:20:46,724 another Boeing 727 smashed straight into a DC-9 carrying 44 people. 287 00:20:51,103 --> 00:20:53,068 Runway incursions, uh... 288 00:20:54,000 --> 00:20:59,206 ...occur due to some failure in the existing system. 289 00:21:00,931 --> 00:21:03,137 Something has happened. 290 00:21:03,206 --> 00:21:05,896 Some directive has not been followed, 291 00:21:05,965 --> 00:21:11,344 some inattention is present in the scenario of a runway incursion. 292 00:21:13,689 --> 00:21:16,172 Which one of these planes was cleared for 24 Left? 293 00:21:19,758 --> 00:21:22,724 Investigators need to find out why there were two planes 294 00:21:22,793 --> 00:21:25,448 on Runway 24 Left at the same time. 295 00:21:26,206 --> 00:21:28,310 One of the principal objectives was to, uh, 296 00:21:28,379 --> 00:21:32,448 immediately see if we could find out what error had taken place 297 00:21:32,517 --> 00:21:34,655 that would allow that situation to occur. 298 00:21:35,413 --> 00:21:37,862 Part of that answer may lie in the wreckage. 299 00:21:38,551 --> 00:21:43,448 But 24 hours after the crash, the investigation is at a near standstill. 300 00:21:43,517 --> 00:21:46,827 There's too much fuel on board the 737. 301 00:21:47,344 --> 00:21:49,620 Crawling through the wreckage would be dangerous. 302 00:21:50,586 --> 00:21:52,034 The aircraft had, uh, 303 00:21:52,103 --> 00:21:53,758 about, uh... 304 00:21:53,827 --> 00:21:55,724 6,000 pounds, 305 00:21:55,793 --> 00:21:57,862 maybe 1,000 gallons of fuel on board. 306 00:21:57,931 --> 00:21:59,931 How long is this going to take? 307 00:22:01,068 --> 00:22:05,758 The, uh, the Saturday was spent defueling the aircraft, 308 00:22:05,827 --> 00:22:08,413 and that's a very slow process. 309 00:22:09,068 --> 00:22:12,827 That took almost all day, uh, before, uh... 310 00:22:12,896 --> 00:22:17,655 the fire department could declare that the, uh, the scene was safe. 311 00:22:19,517 --> 00:22:22,000 With airplane parts littering the airport, 312 00:22:22,068 --> 00:22:24,206 LAX is running at half-capacity. 313 00:22:24,689 --> 00:22:26,724 Two of the four runways are shut down. 314 00:22:27,793 --> 00:22:29,724 That's causing chaos for travellers. 315 00:22:37,172 --> 00:22:40,137 When the NTSB team finally gets access to the wreckage, 316 00:22:40,206 --> 00:22:43,034 they're under enormous pressure to act quickly. 317 00:22:43,931 --> 00:22:46,379 They must gather all the information they need 318 00:22:46,448 --> 00:22:48,448 so the airport can be fully reopened. 319 00:22:52,965 --> 00:22:54,862 Their investigation has a dual purpose. 320 00:22:56,689 --> 00:22:59,172 They must figure out what caused the collision. 321 00:22:59,931 --> 00:23:02,448 They also want to know why so many passengers got trapped 322 00:23:02,517 --> 00:23:04,758 and died in the burning aircraft. 323 00:23:09,310 --> 00:23:13,448 We're not sure what went on, we don't have a recording of it, but, uh, 324 00:23:13,517 --> 00:23:17,413 there were some altercations with people trying to get ahead of other people. 325 00:23:18,275 --> 00:23:20,586 Making matters worse, 326 00:23:20,655 --> 00:23:23,793 one of the emergency-exit doors is inside the plane, 327 00:23:23,862 --> 00:23:26,103 partially blocking the exit. 328 00:23:26,172 --> 00:23:28,689 If you follow the instructions on the card, 329 00:23:28,758 --> 00:23:32,379 the exit card, it will tell you to throw that exit out. 330 00:23:33,620 --> 00:23:37,448 This did not take place, so the right over-the-wing exit 331 00:23:37,517 --> 00:23:41,724 was, uh, I would say partially obstructed by that large hatch. 332 00:23:45,758 --> 00:23:49,034 The NTSB concludes that a reduced number of exit doors 333 00:23:49,103 --> 00:23:52,000 made it impossible for many of the passengers to escape. 334 00:23:54,724 --> 00:23:56,724 With no way out, 335 00:23:56,793 --> 00:23:59,586 they were overcome by toxic smoke as it filled the cabin. 336 00:24:03,344 --> 00:24:07,275 While some investigators analyze wreckage at the crash site, 337 00:24:07,344 --> 00:24:09,655 others focus on Air Traffic Control. 338 00:24:11,827 --> 00:24:14,827 Well, first and foremost, we look at the communications. 339 00:24:15,862 --> 00:24:18,724 Then we also look at the procedures within the facility, 340 00:24:18,793 --> 00:24:22,000 and how those were applied, and were they indeed followed? 341 00:24:23,896 --> 00:24:25,620 To learn more, 342 00:24:25,689 --> 00:24:30,103 the NTSB collects the audiotapes of the controllers' communications with the planes. 343 00:24:31,586 --> 00:24:34,793 Investigators wonder what instructions were given to the pilots 344 00:24:34,862 --> 00:24:36,827 in the moments leading up to the crash. 345 00:24:38,517 --> 00:24:40,758 They also want to know what the flight crews were saying 346 00:24:40,827 --> 00:24:42,793 during those crucial seconds. 347 00:24:44,931 --> 00:24:47,068 Did the pilots follow their instructions? 348 00:24:52,241 --> 00:24:56,206 The cockpit voice recorders should provide investigators with the answer. 349 00:25:02,689 --> 00:25:07,000 But then, Bob McIntosh gets some bad news about the SkyWest Metroliner. 350 00:25:08,241 --> 00:25:09,724 No voice recorder? 351 00:25:10,896 --> 00:25:12,793 Great. 352 00:25:14,517 --> 00:25:17,448 We recognized, looking at the onboard equipment, 353 00:25:17,517 --> 00:25:23,344 that SkyWest 569 did not have a CVR flight recorder installed. 354 00:25:23,413 --> 00:25:25,931 And that was disappointing to us. 355 00:25:29,551 --> 00:25:31,034 At the time of the crash, 356 00:25:31,103 --> 00:25:34,931 commuter planes were not required to carry cockpit voice recorders. 357 00:25:36,931 --> 00:25:40,586 This means the only SkyWest conversations caught on tape 358 00:25:40,655 --> 00:25:44,241 are radio communications recorded in the control tower. 359 00:25:44,310 --> 00:25:46,310 Okay, 24 Left, position and hold, 360 00:25:46,379 --> 00:25:48,172 SkyWest 569. 361 00:25:48,241 --> 00:25:52,310 The two cockpit crew members would have exchanged words, 362 00:25:52,379 --> 00:25:55,034 would've been listening to the air-traffic information 363 00:25:55,103 --> 00:25:58,310 that was coming into their cockpit all the time. 364 00:25:58,379 --> 00:26:02,586 And we recognized that was a valuable piece of data that we had lost. 365 00:26:05,620 --> 00:26:09,655 Using the Air Traffic Control tapes and just one CVR, 366 00:26:09,724 --> 00:26:13,655 investigators try to find out which of the two aircraft in the collision 367 00:26:13,724 --> 00:26:16,827 was actually cleared to use Runway 24 Left. 368 00:26:21,379 --> 00:26:24,413 The answer will raise alarming questions about the safety 369 00:26:24,482 --> 00:26:27,517 of all passengers flying to and from LAX. 370 00:26:31,000 --> 00:26:33,517 246 East, holding short of 47. 371 00:26:34,034 --> 00:26:37,241 The investigation into the deadly collision on Runway 24 Left 372 00:26:37,310 --> 00:26:41,758 focuses on Robin Wascher's conversations with the two planes involved. 373 00:26:43,862 --> 00:26:47,206 Investigators begin with the smaller plane. 374 00:26:47,275 --> 00:26:48,758 Minutes before the accident, 375 00:26:48,827 --> 00:26:52,551 the pilots of the Metroliner waited for permission to take off. 376 00:26:52,620 --> 00:26:54,275 SkyWest 569, 377 00:26:54,344 --> 00:26:58,103 taxi into position and hold, Runway 24 Left. 378 00:26:58,172 --> 00:26:59,862 Traffic will be crossing downfield. 379 00:27:01,034 --> 00:27:05,517 We use the tapes to try to visualize, like a local controller would, 380 00:27:05,586 --> 00:27:08,551 where the aircraft would be on the runway. 381 00:27:09,827 --> 00:27:13,655 The pilots of the SkyWest Metroliner turned their plane onto the runway 382 00:27:13,724 --> 00:27:16,137 and stopped at intersection 45. 383 00:27:17,655 --> 00:27:20,965 They had to wait for another plane to cross the runway downfield. 384 00:27:22,172 --> 00:27:25,482 Okay, 24 Left, position and hold. SkyWest 569. 385 00:27:25,551 --> 00:27:27,413 Okay, stop it right there. 386 00:27:28,275 --> 00:27:30,103 From the Air Traffic Control tapes, 387 00:27:30,172 --> 00:27:33,344 the NTSB can tell that the pilots of the Metroliner 388 00:27:33,413 --> 00:27:35,586 followed all their instructions correctly. 389 00:27:38,413 --> 00:27:40,206 Alright, let's keep going. 390 00:27:40,931 --> 00:27:43,827 Responsibility for the accident must lie elsewhere. 391 00:27:46,137 --> 00:27:48,310 Investigators probe the tapes further. 392 00:27:53,448 --> 00:27:56,620 They look at Wascher's communications with the USAir pilots. 393 00:27:58,482 --> 00:28:00,379 USAir 1493, 394 00:28:00,448 --> 00:28:02,931 for the left side, 24 Left. 395 00:28:04,310 --> 00:28:07,379 Thank you, USAir 1493. You're cleared to land, 24 Left. 396 00:28:08,620 --> 00:28:11,103 USAir 1493 was cleared to land 397 00:28:11,172 --> 00:28:12,931 on the same runway during the time 398 00:28:13,000 --> 00:28:17,620 that SkyWest 5569 was still sitting in position on that same runway. 399 00:28:18,758 --> 00:28:20,724 Cleared to land, 24 Left, 400 00:28:20,793 --> 00:28:22,482 1493. 401 00:28:24,000 --> 00:28:27,241 SkyWest 569, right at intersection 45. 402 00:28:29,172 --> 00:28:31,793 - How long's it been there? - Uh... 403 00:28:33,896 --> 00:28:36,482 One minute... seven seconds. 404 00:28:38,034 --> 00:28:40,241 The Air Traffic Control tapes reveal 405 00:28:40,310 --> 00:28:44,896 that Robin Wascher instructed both the SkyWest Metroliner and the USAir flight 406 00:28:44,965 --> 00:28:47,172 to use Runway 24 Left at the same time. 407 00:28:47,241 --> 00:28:49,068 ...contact Ground, 408 00:28:49,137 --> 00:28:51,137 ...65, when you're... 409 00:28:57,310 --> 00:28:59,034 What the hell?! 410 00:29:09,517 --> 00:29:12,896 When we're examining the recorded voice communications, 411 00:29:12,965 --> 00:29:15,172 what we try to do... 412 00:29:15,241 --> 00:29:18,517 is to put ourselves in the position of the controller. 413 00:29:20,172 --> 00:29:23,034 What would she have seen? What would she have heard? 414 00:29:23,103 --> 00:29:24,620 What would she have done? 415 00:29:26,620 --> 00:29:29,517 Investigators need to know what Robin Wascher was doing 416 00:29:29,586 --> 00:29:31,551 at the time of the crash. 417 00:29:32,068 --> 00:29:35,000 They look at the other flights that she had under her control. 418 00:29:35,965 --> 00:29:39,241 Wings West 5006, taxi across Runway 24 Left. 419 00:29:40,034 --> 00:29:42,793 They learn that in the moments before the collision, 420 00:29:42,862 --> 00:29:46,068 Wascher began to lose track of some of those flights. 421 00:29:46,137 --> 00:29:49,310 - Is that for Philippine 102? - No, sir. Hold short. 422 00:29:49,379 --> 00:29:53,310 Wings West 5006, taxi across Runway 24 Left. 423 00:29:55,206 --> 00:29:57,448 Wings West 5006... 424 00:29:57,862 --> 00:30:01,724 ...was an aircraft that was on the north side of Runway 24 Left... 425 00:30:02,482 --> 00:30:05,344 ...who wanted to cross to the south side. 426 00:30:06,413 --> 00:30:09,137 Wings West 5006, Ground, uh, Tower. 427 00:30:10,379 --> 00:30:12,827 And when she was ready to cross the aircraft, 428 00:30:12,896 --> 00:30:14,655 the crew did not respond. 429 00:30:18,206 --> 00:30:20,758 Wascher spent nearly a full minute of her time 430 00:30:20,827 --> 00:30:24,620 trying to re-establish radio contact with the flight crossing the runway. 431 00:30:26,965 --> 00:30:28,655 Can I hear the rest of that exchange? 432 00:30:33,758 --> 00:30:36,827 Wings West 5006 on frequency again. 433 00:30:36,896 --> 00:30:39,275 Changed radios. Sorry about that. 434 00:30:41,068 --> 00:30:45,758 They advised her they had inadvertently been on another frequency. 435 00:30:45,827 --> 00:30:47,793 5006, you're back with me. 436 00:30:48,344 --> 00:30:50,827 Yeah, we didn't mean to switch radios. We're on now. 437 00:30:51,586 --> 00:30:54,862 And that created a distraction for the local controller. 438 00:30:55,413 --> 00:30:57,068 Okay, I thought I lost you. 439 00:30:58,241 --> 00:31:00,793 Sorry. We thought we lost you. We apologize. 440 00:31:01,931 --> 00:31:03,931 Not a problem. 441 00:31:05,862 --> 00:31:09,551 But investigators discover that flight wasn't the only aircraft 442 00:31:09,620 --> 00:31:13,344 Robin Wascher was fixated on in the moments before the crash. 443 00:31:14,862 --> 00:31:17,862 Tower, Wings West 5072 is ready for takeoff. 444 00:31:19,241 --> 00:31:20,793 Wings West 5072? 445 00:31:23,000 --> 00:31:27,275 With USAir 1493 less than a minute from touchdown, 446 00:31:27,344 --> 00:31:31,793 Wascher hears from another Wings West aircraft, Flight 5072. 447 00:31:33,068 --> 00:31:38,241 When Wings West 5702 called to say that he was ready for departure, 448 00:31:38,310 --> 00:31:42,413 it was obvious to us that she didn't understand who this aircraft was. 449 00:31:43,586 --> 00:31:46,586 Wings West 5072, are you at 47 or full length? 450 00:31:46,655 --> 00:31:49,137 - We're at full length. - Okay, hold short. 451 00:31:50,241 --> 00:31:52,379 Roger. Holding short. 452 00:31:58,068 --> 00:32:00,793 Investigators need to hear from Wascher herself. 453 00:32:02,965 --> 00:32:05,310 I couldn't find the flight-progress strip. 454 00:32:06,206 --> 00:32:08,068 They hope to learn why she didn't recognize 455 00:32:08,137 --> 00:32:10,413 a flight that was under her control. 456 00:32:11,896 --> 00:32:15,379 I couldn't find the strip, so I asked my supervisor to help me. 457 00:32:15,448 --> 00:32:16,827 Francita? 458 00:32:18,655 --> 00:32:20,931 I need a strip for Wings West 5072. 459 00:32:24,620 --> 00:32:27,310 She explains that as the pilots of the Metroliner 460 00:32:27,379 --> 00:32:30,137 waited on the runway for permission to take off, 461 00:32:30,206 --> 00:32:33,000 she was searching for another flight's progress strip. 462 00:32:36,620 --> 00:32:38,620 Before she could get back on track, 463 00:32:38,689 --> 00:32:42,344 USAir Flight 1493 crashed into the back of the Metroliner. 464 00:32:46,655 --> 00:32:48,275 What the hell?! 465 00:32:53,655 --> 00:32:55,793 NTSB investigators now know 466 00:32:55,862 --> 00:32:59,448 that human error played a major role in the collision at LAX. 467 00:33:02,517 --> 00:33:06,551 Remarkably, when she cleared the USAir flight to land, 468 00:33:06,620 --> 00:33:10,344 Robin Wascher simply forgot about the Metroliner waiting on the runway. 469 00:33:13,068 --> 00:33:14,965 This situation that occurred 470 00:33:15,034 --> 00:33:18,000 is a situation that no controller wants to go through. 471 00:33:19,275 --> 00:33:23,448 You train your whole career for this not to happen, 472 00:33:23,517 --> 00:33:25,517 and when it does happen, it's... 473 00:33:25,586 --> 00:33:28,379 you can't even describe the feelings that you go through. 474 00:33:30,413 --> 00:33:32,482 A situation like this... 475 00:33:32,551 --> 00:33:34,793 could potentially happen to anybody. 476 00:33:34,862 --> 00:33:36,379 We are all human. 477 00:33:38,000 --> 00:33:40,931 After the accident, Wascher left her job at LAX, 478 00:33:41,000 --> 00:33:43,620 and never worked as an air-traffic controller again. 479 00:33:45,620 --> 00:33:49,034 But investigators believe there are likely more causes to this accident 480 00:33:49,103 --> 00:33:50,965 than one person's fatal error. 481 00:33:52,896 --> 00:33:55,172 Any time that you do an investigation, 482 00:33:55,241 --> 00:33:58,793 it's easy to point the blame at one individual. 483 00:33:58,862 --> 00:34:01,655 What you want to do is to say: 484 00:34:01,724 --> 00:34:03,310 "Why did this occur, 485 00:34:03,379 --> 00:34:06,482 and what can we do to prevent a reoccurrence?" 486 00:34:07,689 --> 00:34:10,241 Answers to those questions begin to emerge 487 00:34:10,310 --> 00:34:13,758 as the NTSB examines the daily routine in the control tower 488 00:34:13,827 --> 00:34:15,758 in the weeks before the accident. 489 00:34:18,000 --> 00:34:21,586 It was one of those "you don't know you have a problem until you have a problem." 490 00:34:24,310 --> 00:34:27,586 It turns out another disaster was narrowly averted 491 00:34:27,655 --> 00:34:29,931 seven months before the collision. 492 00:34:30,000 --> 00:34:33,689 A landing DC-10 flew just over an Airbus waiting on the runway 493 00:34:33,758 --> 00:34:35,620 to take off at LAX. 494 00:34:36,689 --> 00:34:38,620 Los Angeles Airport has always been known 495 00:34:38,689 --> 00:34:42,103 as one of the number-one runway-incursion airports in the system, 496 00:34:42,172 --> 00:34:44,724 and changes were overdue. 497 00:34:46,827 --> 00:34:49,241 Controllers at LAX produced documentation 498 00:34:49,310 --> 00:34:51,517 showing that immediately after that close call, 499 00:34:51,586 --> 00:34:55,655 they alerted officials that the control tower was understaffed. 500 00:34:59,275 --> 00:35:04,241 They also explained that regions around the northern runways were invisible to controllers, 501 00:35:04,310 --> 00:35:06,793 because their view was blocked by a light tower. 502 00:35:24,103 --> 00:35:26,517 We went up in the tower, climbed the stairs, 503 00:35:26,586 --> 00:35:29,655 and asked the air-traffic controllers to step aside 504 00:35:29,724 --> 00:35:32,551 while we sat in their chairs and looked out the window. 505 00:35:34,000 --> 00:35:39,310 The view that the, uh, air-traffic controller was presented with had... 506 00:35:39,379 --> 00:35:41,137 an obstruction, 507 00:35:41,206 --> 00:35:44,965 a light pole that, uh, produced a... a glare. 508 00:35:45,034 --> 00:35:48,034 And it was a light that lit up the airport ramp. 509 00:35:51,931 --> 00:35:55,724 Robin Wascher may not have been able to see the SkyWest Metroliner 510 00:35:55,793 --> 00:35:57,551 as it sat out on the runway. 511 00:36:02,241 --> 00:36:04,931 NTSB investigators look at other tools 512 00:36:05,000 --> 00:36:08,103 she could've used to detect the forgotten plane. 513 00:36:08,172 --> 00:36:12,620 Surface radar is generally used during periods of low visibility. 514 00:36:13,241 --> 00:36:16,413 It is a tool by which the local controller, 515 00:36:16,482 --> 00:36:18,827 should they so choose, 516 00:36:18,896 --> 00:36:22,172 be able to visually confirm on that scope 517 00:36:22,241 --> 00:36:25,034 that an aircraft is indeed where it says it is. 518 00:36:26,862 --> 00:36:30,103 Ground radar displays all aircraft and ground vehicles 519 00:36:30,172 --> 00:36:31,862 moving around the airport. 520 00:36:36,344 --> 00:36:40,000 But on the night of the accident, that system wasn't working. 521 00:36:41,620 --> 00:36:43,551 You're holding short. Is that correct, sir? 522 00:36:43,620 --> 00:36:45,724 Yes, ma'am, we're holding short. 523 00:36:45,793 --> 00:36:51,551 It was in constant, uh, out-of-service, in-service, out-of-service, in-service, 524 00:36:51,620 --> 00:36:55,000 and gave the management, uh, a lot of trouble. 525 00:36:59,379 --> 00:37:03,068 The system was not very reliable and we did lodge complaints 526 00:37:03,137 --> 00:37:07,275 to have it fixed and to upgrade the system as soon as we could. 527 00:37:08,620 --> 00:37:12,034 Investigators learn that just four days before the accident, 528 00:37:12,103 --> 00:37:15,000 officials at LAX had formally asked the FAA 529 00:37:15,068 --> 00:37:18,448 to treat the failing ground radar with the highest priority. 530 00:37:22,689 --> 00:37:26,551 The radar drive and some of the drive mechanism 531 00:37:26,620 --> 00:37:30,034 had some rings gears and spur gears 532 00:37:30,103 --> 00:37:34,310 that they had to go to machine shops and literally make that part, 533 00:37:34,379 --> 00:37:37,310 because it would wear out on a regular basis, 534 00:37:37,379 --> 00:37:39,034 trying to rotate the antenna. 535 00:37:40,344 --> 00:37:43,379 We looked into this particular problem 536 00:37:43,448 --> 00:37:49,275 and learned that Los Angeles had been slated to receive a new system in 1988. 537 00:37:50,862 --> 00:37:52,758 However, that date had slipped, 538 00:37:52,827 --> 00:37:54,620 and at that time, 539 00:37:54,689 --> 00:37:57,620 they were not sure when they were going to get a new radar system. 540 00:37:59,793 --> 00:38:02,586 With the ground-radar system out of commission, 541 00:38:02,655 --> 00:38:06,517 and with her view of the runway impeded by blinding lights, 542 00:38:06,586 --> 00:38:10,000 Robin Wascher's chances of discovering her error were slim. 543 00:38:13,241 --> 00:38:16,965 Investigators turn their attention to the cockpit of the USAir flight. 544 00:38:18,103 --> 00:38:22,275 They wonder why the pilots didn't see the Metroliner out on the runway 545 00:38:22,344 --> 00:38:24,172 and abort their landing. 546 00:38:25,551 --> 00:38:28,620 Well, most of us in the pilot community would recognize 547 00:38:28,689 --> 00:38:32,517 that it's our job to scan that runway and find aircraft 548 00:38:32,586 --> 00:38:35,517 that might be out there or anything else prior to landing. 549 00:38:37,137 --> 00:38:39,793 Like all planes, the Metroliner is equipped with lights 550 00:38:39,862 --> 00:38:41,586 to make it more visible at night. 551 00:38:43,172 --> 00:38:45,758 There are strobe lights on the wingtips and the tail, 552 00:38:45,827 --> 00:38:48,034 navigation lights on the wings 553 00:38:48,103 --> 00:38:51,758 and a coloured anti-collision beacon on top of the vertical stabilizer. 554 00:38:52,724 --> 00:38:55,551 We were concerned about the SkyWest lighting, 555 00:38:55,620 --> 00:38:58,551 and had to look at the flight-operations manual. 556 00:38:58,620 --> 00:39:02,344 And we found that the operating procedure for that company 557 00:39:02,413 --> 00:39:06,000 was to turn on the strobe lights only after clearance for takeoff. 558 00:39:07,620 --> 00:39:09,448 So no other lights were required? 559 00:39:11,344 --> 00:39:12,827 Okay, thank you. 560 00:39:15,827 --> 00:39:18,586 The Metroliner wasn't yet cleared for takeoff. 561 00:39:19,344 --> 00:39:22,655 So the only lights that would've been lit while it waited on the runway 562 00:39:22,724 --> 00:39:25,482 were the navigation lights on the wings and tail, 563 00:39:25,551 --> 00:39:27,931 and the anti-collision beacon on the tail. 564 00:39:29,827 --> 00:39:32,689 NTSB investigators then use a helicopter 565 00:39:32,758 --> 00:39:35,517 to put themselves in the position of the USAir pilots 566 00:39:35,586 --> 00:39:38,517 as they were making the approach to Runway 24 Left. 567 00:39:40,517 --> 00:39:43,413 We went up and we actually flew that final approach 568 00:39:43,482 --> 00:39:46,724 in order to verify what we, uh, 569 00:39:46,793 --> 00:39:50,724 what we thought might be the condition of obscuration. 570 00:39:53,413 --> 00:39:55,689 They positioned a Metroliner on the runway 571 00:39:55,758 --> 00:39:58,068 in the same spot where the collision occurred. 572 00:40:01,275 --> 00:40:04,724 And sure enough, we could not see that, uh, 573 00:40:04,793 --> 00:40:08,379 that aircraft parked out there at spot 45 and 47. 574 00:40:08,448 --> 00:40:10,000 You just couldn't see it. 575 00:40:13,586 --> 00:40:15,206 Looks real good. 576 00:40:15,827 --> 00:40:17,103 Ah... 577 00:40:18,586 --> 00:40:21,379 The investigation determines the lights on the Metroliner 578 00:40:21,448 --> 00:40:24,034 were the same colour and brightness as the runway lights. 579 00:40:26,034 --> 00:40:30,000 The plane may have been all but invisible to the pilots of USAir 1493. 580 00:40:31,482 --> 00:40:33,413 You're coming out of 500. 581 00:40:35,206 --> 00:40:38,310 The anti-collision beacon in particular 582 00:40:38,379 --> 00:40:40,793 would've been lost in a sea of lights. 583 00:40:59,551 --> 00:41:04,275 When the National Transportation Safety Board releases its report, 584 00:41:04,344 --> 00:41:08,620 controller error is determined to be a cause of the runway collision. 585 00:41:13,827 --> 00:41:17,137 We're in the business of determining, uh, 586 00:41:17,206 --> 00:41:18,689 why something happened. 587 00:41:18,758 --> 00:41:22,862 You may call it a cause or causes or contributing factors, 588 00:41:22,931 --> 00:41:27,000 but our job ends when the next accident is prevented. 589 00:41:28,586 --> 00:41:30,172 Preventing accidents on the runways of LAX 590 00:41:30,241 --> 00:41:32,724 would prove to be a much greater challenge 591 00:41:32,793 --> 00:41:34,517 than investigators could imagine. 592 00:41:42,482 --> 00:41:45,758 The collision between USAir Flight 1493 and a SkyWest Metroliner 593 00:41:45,827 --> 00:41:47,310 alarms the public. 594 00:41:51,172 --> 00:41:53,931 The accident seems to prove that controllers cannot safely handle 595 00:41:54,000 --> 00:41:56,965 the increasing traffic at Los Angeles International Airport. 596 00:42:00,206 --> 00:42:04,413 The NTSB investigation points to Robin Wascher's failure to maintain awareness 597 00:42:04,482 --> 00:42:08,137 of the flights under her control as one cause of the accident. 598 00:42:12,137 --> 00:42:14,620 But the report also points to a failing system 599 00:42:14,689 --> 00:42:17,344 in the Air Traffic Control facilities at LAX. 600 00:42:18,689 --> 00:42:21,034 In the months and years following the accident, 601 00:42:21,103 --> 00:42:24,068 improvements are made to air-traffic facilities 602 00:42:24,137 --> 00:42:27,137 in an attempt to make the airport a safer place. 603 00:42:27,965 --> 00:42:32,896 The failing ground-radar system is finally replaced with a newer model. 604 00:42:32,965 --> 00:42:36,241 Today, at Los Angeles Tower, we have the newest system out there. 605 00:42:36,310 --> 00:42:41,172 Each arrival or departure taxiing on the taxiways or on the runways 606 00:42:41,241 --> 00:42:43,655 have a call sign and type aircraft associated with it, 607 00:42:43,724 --> 00:42:46,862 so you have positive identification of all aircraft at all times. 608 00:42:48,103 --> 00:42:50,344 New policies governing the way flight-progress strips 609 00:42:50,413 --> 00:42:52,931 are handled in the tower are put in place. 610 00:42:54,931 --> 00:42:57,068 Ground controllers now organize the strips 611 00:42:57,137 --> 00:43:00,793 before they make their way to the local controller. 612 00:43:02,448 --> 00:43:05,448 The extra set of eyes reduces the local controller's workload. 613 00:43:09,172 --> 00:43:14,275 Five years after the crash, a new Air Traffic Control tower is built at LAX. 614 00:43:15,172 --> 00:43:19,103 The tower is 16 storeys higher, three times larger, 615 00:43:19,172 --> 00:43:22,689 and offers controllers clear, unobstructed sightlines. 616 00:43:25,310 --> 00:43:28,862 New regulations concerning aircraft lighting are also put in place. 617 00:43:30,517 --> 00:43:34,103 It becomes mandatory for pilots to turn on all their lights 618 00:43:34,172 --> 00:43:36,344 before they move out onto a runway. 619 00:43:47,586 --> 00:43:49,344 But despite the improvements, 620 00:43:49,413 --> 00:43:53,068 the rate of runway incursions at LAX only goes up. 621 00:43:54,000 --> 00:43:57,000 Throughout the '90s and even into the 2000s... 622 00:43:58,137 --> 00:44:00,413 ...I would describe it as a common event. 623 00:44:00,482 --> 00:44:04,379 LAX certainly was one of the worst airports we had 624 00:44:04,448 --> 00:44:06,275 for a number of incursions. 625 00:44:06,344 --> 00:44:08,758 Ten years after the accident, 626 00:44:08,827 --> 00:44:12,827 more serious runway incursions were happening at LAX 627 00:44:12,896 --> 00:44:15,379 than at any other airport in the United States. 628 00:44:16,862 --> 00:44:19,275 They had double-digit runway incursions 629 00:44:19,344 --> 00:44:22,206 and serious runway incursions almost every year. 630 00:44:22,275 --> 00:44:24,517 And, in fact, in 2007, 631 00:44:24,586 --> 00:44:26,931 they actually had 21 runway incursions. 632 00:44:29,931 --> 00:44:32,896 In an attempt to reduce the problem once and for all, 633 00:44:32,965 --> 00:44:37,413 the Federal Aviation Administration begins work on a new system of runway lights 634 00:44:37,482 --> 00:44:39,413 to keep planes apart on the ground. 635 00:44:40,344 --> 00:44:44,000 The Runway Status Light System is a series of... 636 00:44:44,068 --> 00:44:47,310 runway-entrance lighting that we put at taxiways, 637 00:44:47,379 --> 00:44:50,758 or takeoff hold lighting that we actually put on the runway itself. 638 00:44:53,413 --> 00:44:55,448 The system is fully automatic. 639 00:44:56,103 --> 00:45:00,448 It uses a series of red lights embedded in the runways and taxiways. 640 00:45:01,620 --> 00:45:04,896 The lights warn pilots if there is conflicting traffic. 641 00:45:04,965 --> 00:45:07,758 If the runway status lights illuminate red, 642 00:45:07,827 --> 00:45:10,793 it tells a pilot that it is unsafe, or a vehicle driver, 643 00:45:10,862 --> 00:45:14,793 that it is unsafe to either cross or enter that runway. 644 00:45:14,862 --> 00:45:18,275 And it triggers because there is an aircraft landing or departing, 645 00:45:18,344 --> 00:45:20,413 there's some other traffic on the runway. 646 00:45:22,620 --> 00:45:26,172 The runway status lights seems to be one of the most effective systems we have 647 00:45:26,241 --> 00:45:28,000 for preventing runway incursions 648 00:45:28,068 --> 00:45:30,137 and certainly the serious runway incursions. 649 00:45:31,758 --> 00:45:33,517 In April 2009, 650 00:45:33,586 --> 00:45:37,000 the technology was installed at Los Angeles International Airport. 651 00:45:37,655 --> 00:45:40,068 Prototypes of the system have also been installed 652 00:45:40,137 --> 00:45:42,689 at Dallas-Fort Worth and San Diego. 653 00:45:45,241 --> 00:45:49,068 By 2011, runway status lights will be a key feature 654 00:45:49,137 --> 00:45:51,896 at dozens of airports across the United States. 655 00:45:53,103 --> 00:45:55,482 The equipment we're using at Los Angeles Tower today 656 00:45:55,551 --> 00:45:58,551 is much better than the equipment we used back in 1991. 657 00:45:58,620 --> 00:46:01,724 It's been upgraded, it's much more reliable, 658 00:46:01,793 --> 00:46:05,000 and it gives the controllers the tools they need 659 00:46:05,068 --> 00:46:09,517 to make sure that the runways are clear and to keep the aircraft moving. 660 00:46:11,000 --> 00:46:15,172 Though new technology can never guarantee 100% safety, 661 00:46:15,241 --> 00:46:19,068 the improvements at LAX have restored public confidence in the airport, 662 00:46:19,137 --> 00:46:22,793 even among those who survived Flight 1493. 663 00:46:25,103 --> 00:46:29,344 I spent a couple of days in intensive care at the local hospital and... 664 00:46:29,413 --> 00:46:31,517 I had nightmares, by the way, 665 00:46:31,586 --> 00:46:33,551 following, uh, uh... 666 00:46:33,620 --> 00:46:37,862 my release from the hospital for quite a number of days. 667 00:46:37,931 --> 00:46:41,448 Uh, but I'm doing fine now. I have no problem, uh, 668 00:46:41,517 --> 00:46:44,103 with getting on airplanes and flying, 669 00:46:44,172 --> 00:46:47,172 and I've got great confidence in the airline system. 670 00:47:00,068 --> 00:47:02,137 difuze